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 ABSTRACT 
 
The Impact of Cooling Measures:  
Evidence from Hong Kong Residential Re-sale Market 
by 
HU Mengna 
Master of Philosophy 
 
  
To understand the effects of credit constraints and transaction taxes in housing market, 
this paper exploits the cooling measures imposed by the Hong Kong government 
aimed at addressing the overheated property market. The cooling measures include 
mortgage tightening measure which decreases the financial leverage for households 
and stamp duty measure which heightens the transaction costs for certain buyers. By 
using a comprehensive transaction-level dataset, we first assess the impact of both 
measures on trading activity in the residential re-sale market. The empirical findings 
suggest that the mortgage tightening measure does not have a significant impact on the 
overall trading activity in the overall market, but forces certain buyers to purchase 
smaller-sized homes. The stamp duty measure leads to lower trading activity in the 
overall market and the negative effect spreads across the submarkets. We then examine 
the behavioral response in the timing of transactions and tax incidence to special stamp 
duty, a transaction tax aimed at combating speculators. We find that the imposition of 
the special stamp duty is associated with an average of 6.8% price reduction of 
properties that are subject to such tax duty compared to those that are not subject to 
such tax. We also provide graphical evidence on the bunching in transactions right 
above the notch on holding period where the tax rate drops to 0%, suggesting that 
special stamp duty rate generates significant lock-in effects. Lastly, we employ non-
linear models to capture the regime switching behaviors of transactions and housing 
prices in the aggregate housing market. The models reveal the occurrence of regime 
switches in aggregate transactions following the government intervention, particularly 
after the introduction of stamp duty measure, while no abrupt regime switches are 
observed in the price dynamics since the intervention except for the episode in the end 
of 2015. The larger impact on trading activity may indicate that most of the effect of 
those measures falls on the quantity in the housing market rather than the price.   
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2008 has reminded policymakers of the 
importance of keeping the housing boom-bust cycle in check. Its formidable damage 
to the financial sector and the broader economy alerts the policymakers to take pre-
emptive actions that can prevent the formation of housing bubbles. In the wake of GFC 
since 2009, major central banks carried out unprecedented quantitative easing (QE) 
program aimed at stimulating the sluggish economy. As a result of the abundant 
liquidity and ultra-low interest rates amid the QE program, property prices increase 
sharply in many regions and countries, particularly in Asia. In order to stabilize the 
overheated housing market, several governments, such as Singapore, Hong Kong and 
South Korea, hence introduce a few rounds of measures from the demand side, which 
are also known as the cooling measures.  
 
The cooling measures rolled out by various governments mainly fall into two 
categories. On one hand, they introduce measures to contain banks’ overexposure to 
the property market as well as prevent excess bank lending from fueling the 
imbalanced housing market. Such measures as tightening mortgage financing through 
lowering the loan-to-value ratio protect banks from excessive risks. On the other hand, 
transaction taxes are utilized as a particular means to cool the overheated housing 
market. The heightened transaction taxes, also known as stamp duty measures, 
particularly target certain groups of home buyers, such as the short-term speculators, 
the foreigner investors, as well as the local purchasers who are in possession of 
multiple properties.  
 
The study on the behavioral response to the down-payment constraints1 and real estate 
transaction taxes in the housing market is not little. Both theoretical and empirical 
papers suggest that they have important implications in the housing market (e.g. Stein 
(1995), Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006), Cunningham and Engelhardt (2008) and 
Besley et al. (2014)). Meanwhile, the debate over the effectiveness of the recent 
cooling measures introduced after the GFC is intense. However, the possible 
consequences of those cooling measures in the housing market still remain 
understudied. The paper by Fu et al. (2013) is the only relevant study on a government 
                                                     
1 down-payment constraint , credit constraint and borrowing constraint will be used interchangeably. 
2 
intervention in an Asian country which disallowed stamp duty payment deferral in the 
presale market in Singapore in October 2006. Their findings caution against the 
utilization of transaction taxes to stabilize the housing market. Therefore, this paper 
attempts to complement the existing literature by examining the impacts of the 
aforementioned cooling measures in housing market following the GFC in another 
Asian metropolis, Hong Kong during another sample period. Besides, a few recent 
studies studying the distortions to the distribution of housing prices and transactions 
caused by different aspects of transaction taxes at micro level. Leung et al. (2014) 
explored the non-linear stamp duty structure in Hong Kong and find tax-caused 
distortions in both housing prices and transactions. This paper also tries to investigate 
the possible distortions induced by the recent transaction tax, the special stamp duty 
aimed at deterring short-term speculators. The details of this particular tax measure 
will be elaborated in Chapter Two. Essentially, we attempt to answer the following 
research questions in this thesis: (i) Whether and to what extent the cooling measures 
will affect the trading activity in Hong Kong’s residential re-sale market? (ii) Whether 
the special stamp duty will cause any distortion to the distribution of housing prices 
and transactions? 
 
More specifically, we carry out our analysis in several steps. First, we examine 
whether those cooling measures have any impact on the frequency of transactions in 
the overall market and the submarkets. We sub-divide the overall market into several 
submarkets categorized by the home salable area, in order to capture their 
heterogeneous impacts across the housing ladder. Second, we provide micro-evidence 
on the market reaction to the special stamp duty in respect of price and transaction 
changes. Last, we employ non-linear models to capture any possible regime switching 
behaviors in the dynamics of aggregate transactions and housing prices following the 
government intervention.    
 
Our empirical findings are as follows: (i) Lowering financial leverage for households 
plays a statistically insignificant role in affecting the trading activity in the overall 
market. Interestingly, this measure generates different impacts on the trading activity 
in various submarkets. Specifically, it leads to higher demand for small sized housing 
units by an amount of 0.033 percentage points compared to the average before the 
3 
intervention. On the contrary, the measure causes lower trading activity in higher-end 
submarkets, i.e. submarkets C and DE. (ii) The stamp duty measure which raises the 
transaction taxes for certain groups of buyers has a negative and statistically significant 
impact on the trading activity in the overall market. The measure is associated with a 
reduction in trading activity of 0.184 percentage points relative to the average before 
the intervention. The negative impact of this measure is widespread across submarkets 
except for the luxury segment. (iii) The properties which are subject to the special 
stamp duty are sold at a lower price by 6.8% compared to the equivalent properties 
that are not subject to the tax. We also provide graphical evidence that the special 
stamp duty causes tax avoidance or tax evasion bunching in transactions right above 
the notch where the holding period2 of the property is 24 months or 36 months. (iv) 
The aggregate housing transactions experience regime switches following the 
government intervention, while the aggregate housing prices show no significant 
deviation from the higher regime except for the temporary episode in the second half 
of 2015, suggesting that the cooling measures have a larger impact on quantity relative 
to the price.  
 
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 1 presents an introduction of this thesis. It 
highlights the background, objective and motivations of this research. Chapter 2 
provides details about the Hong Kong housing market and the recent cooling measures. 
Chapter 3 reviews the previous studies. Chapter 4 develops the research questions and 
summarizes the data used in this thesis. Chapter 5 presents the models that we will 
apply in this thesis. The empirical results will be presented and analyzed in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 7 discusses policy implications of this thesis. Chapter 8 concludes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2 The holding period is calculated as the time difference between the recent transaction date and the last transaction date of the same property.  
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Chapter 2. Background 
2.1. Hong Kong’s housing market  
Following the recovery from Global Financial Crisis in 2009, Hong Kong has 
witnessed a new wave of property market booming. In the secondary residential 
housing market, housing prices had raised by 2.6% in 2010M10 and were around 18% 
up on a year earlier as shown in Figure 1. The total monthly transaction volume (Figure 
1) also experienced a considerable increase during the same period. The trading 
activity by 2010 has more than doubled compared to the trough in 2008. It is worth 
noting that the frequency of short-term3 resales, proxied by the property transactions 
being held no more than two years since last acquisition, was extraordinarily high 
during this time period (Figure 2). By 2010M10, the short-term resale activity accounts 
for more than 26% of the monthly trading activity in the secondary market.  
 
The soaring housing price is a result of severe supply-demand imbalances. The 
increasing demand for properties comes from two types of buyers. On one hand, the 
demand from the genuine home buyers is increasing as a result of the “echo” of the 
baby boomer generation and smaller average household size. The early baby boomer 
generation enters into the ready to marriage group and the large number of household 
formation of this group becomes one driving force behind robust housing demand. 
According to the Census and Statistics Department of Hong Kong, the average number 
of first marriage of both parties4 over the period of 2005-2013 and 1996-2004 is 
34,880 and 26,363, respectively, indicating an approximately 32% increase in the 
number of household formation. Meanwhile, the average household size has declined 
from 3.9 to 2.9 from 1982 to 2015 as revealed by the Census and Statistics Department 
of Hong Kong. On the other hand, the demand from local and foreign investors 
including speculators is unprecedented as they regard the real estate as a safe heaven 
to place their abundant liquidity amid quantitative easing by major central banks since 
2009. However, the supply of new homes is still in great shortage. The average 
completions of private domestic units is only around 8,8005 over the period of 2007-
2009, and the new supply is not expected to be increased by a sufficient amount in the 
short run. Against such background, the Hong Kong government decided to address 
                                                     
3 The Legislative Council of Hong Kong also regard the properties disposed within 4 months since last acquisitions as short-term re-sales.  
4 https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp160.jsp?productCode=FA100055 
5 According to the statistics on yearly completions of private domestic units compiled by Rating and Valuation Department.  
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the overheated housing market by introducing a number of cooling measures from the 
demand side, including the mortgage tightening measure and stamp duty measure.   
 
2.2. The mortgage tightening measure 
The government introduced seven rounds of mortgage tightening measure, which 
tightens the mortgage financing for households since October 2009, in order to reduce 
the banks’ exposure to the property market as well as prevent excess bank lending 
from fueling the imbalanced housing market. The policy tools include lowering loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio, imposing limits on the debt-servicing ratio (DSR) for mortgage, 
and enhancing the stress tests of borrowers’ repayment ability against interest hikes. 
The LTV ratio is defined as the loan amount divided by the appraised value of property 
used for the loan. The DSR is defined as the monthly repayment obligations of the 
borrower as a percentage of monthly income 6 . The first round of the mortgage 
tightening measure starting in October 2009 only targets the properties in the luxury 
market. The subsequent five rounds of measures starting from August 2010 target not 
only the luxury market but also the overall market. The last round of measure with the 
effect from February 2015 solely targets the buyers in the small-sized market in 
response to the astonishing rapid price appreciation rate in small housing units. Table 
1 in Appendix shows details of the seven rounds of mortgage tightening measures 
including the specified LTV ratio on the properties within different ranges of property 
values and the corresponding capped mortgage amounts, as well as the stipulated debt 
servicing ratio (DSR). The government intervention in tightening the mortgage 
financing by banks in the form of a dramatic decline in the average loan-to-value ratio 
for new mortgage approvals by banks is shown in Figure 3. 
 
2.3. The stamp duty measure 
The government rolled out three rounds of stamp duty measure, which the government 
explained were intended for “demand-management”, consists of heightened 
transaction taxes on purchases or sales of properties by certain groups of buyers 
starting from late November 2010. The stamp duty measure includes special stamp 
duty (SSD), buyer’s stamp duty (BSD) and a doubled ad valorem stamp duty (DSD). 
The purpose of SSD is to combat speculative activities, while the implementation of 
                                                     
6 http://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-information/guidelines-and-circulars/guidelines/guide_594b.shtml 
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BSD and DSD is for the sake of discouraging non-local buyers from purchasing 
residential properties in Hong Kong, as well as discouraging Hong Kong permanent 
residents from purchasing multiple properties. Table 2 in Appendix shows the details 
of the stamp duty measures regarding the affected groups of buyers and the 
corresponding imposed rates.  
 
Since we will have one section particularly focusing on the market reaction to the 
special stamp duty, we hereby introduce the special stamp duty in detail below. To 
curb the short-term speculation, the Hong Kong Government announced on 19 
November 2010 that the special stamp duty will be imposed on top of the ad valorem 
stamp duty on the disposal of residential properties with effect from 20 November 
2010. The policy stipulates that any residential property acquired on or after 20 
November 2010, either by an individual or a company (regardless of where it is 
incorporated), and resold within 24 months, will be subject to a special stamp duty. 
The special stamp duty is calculated by reference to the stated consideration or the 
market value of the property (whichever is the higher), at varying rates based on the 
holding periods of the property being disposed. The holding period will count from 
the date when the seller or the transfer acquired the property to the date when he or 
she disposed of the property according to the Inland Revenue Department of Hong 
Kong. 15%, 10% and 5% will be charged on the residential property which was 
acquired between 20 November 2010 and 26 October 2012, and disposed within 6 
months, 12 months and 24 months, respectively. On 26th October 2012, the 
government announced the extension of the holding period for imposition of special 
stamp duty on residential properties from 2 years to 3 years and the increase of the 
SSD rates which vary from 10% to 20%, in order to further cool down the overheated 
residential property market. With effect from 27 October 2012, any residential 
property acquired on or after 27 October 2012, either by an individual or a company 
(regardless of where it is incorporated), and resold within 36 months, will be subject 
to a new special stamp duty. 20%, 15% and 10% will be charged on the property which 
was acquired on or after 27 October 2012, and disposed within 6 months, 12 months 
and 36 months, respectively. Figure 4 illustrates the corresponding special stamp duty 
tax rates for the two rounds measure against different holding periods of properties.  
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Figure 1 illustrates the historical movements of the aggregate housing prices, 
transaction volumes at monthly frequency and the timeline of cooling measures in the 
residential re-sale market. The long-term upward trend in housing prices observed 
prior to the policy intervention is not changed, even though some temporary episodes 
of the downward movements are also observed in the figure. By contrast, the 
transaction volume is substantially suppressed since the government intervention. The 
short-term resale activity, especially the properties which were resold within 12 
months since their last acquisition, almost vanishes in response to the heightened 
transaction taxes charged on speculators, especially after the enhancement of special 
stamp duty in October 2012 (Figure 2). A formal econometric analysis, however, 
requires isolating the anticipation effects, dismantling other confounding policy effects 
and controlling for macroeconomic conditions, when evaluating the impact of the 
policy change on housing market activity. 
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Chapter 3. Literature Review 
The role of credit constraints and transaction taxes in the housing market have attracted 
considerable attention in both theoretical and empirical literature. Typically, a house 
purchase requires a significant amount of down-payment, which is a crucial credit 
constraint for many households. This credit constraint can have important implications 
on the behavior of a significant proportion of households, especially the young 
households, in the housing market. The transaction taxes which impose additional 
transaction costs for the home buyers also have significant impact on households’ 
purchasing behaviors. The transaction taxes are normally in the form of capital gain 
taxes and ad valorem taxes (e.g. stamp duty and transfer tax). The capital gain taxes 
are charged on the profits realized on the sale of the property and ad valorem taxes are 
proportional to the total property value. Stamp duties are essentially the registration 
taxes that the buyer or seller is required to pay in many countries (the U.K., the U.S., 
Germany, Hong Kong and Singapore, etc.).   
 
3.1. The impact of down-payment constraints  
The models capturing the behavior of the aggregate housing market developed by 
Stein (1995) and Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) highlight the importance of down-
payment constraints. These models suggest that housing transaction is a positive 
function of housing price changes for a number of households who are heavily credit 
constrained. When the housing price appreciates, those constrained movers can 
accumulate sufficient equity by disposing their existing homes and upgrade to a new 
home. However, when the housing price falls, the existing homeowners are more 
constrained by the liquidity so that they are unable to climb up the housing ladder.  
 
A few more papers have empirically examined the impact of credit constraints in the 
housing market. Linneman and Wachter (1989) find that the presence of borrowing 
constraints adversely affects the homeownership propensities and the mortgage 
innovations help reduce these effects. Genesove and Mayer (1994) suggest that owners 
with high loan-to-value ratios take longer time to sell their properties compared to 
those with low loan-to-value ratios. They further show that owners with high loan-to-
value ratios also tend to set higher asking prices than those less constrained owners, 
i.e. owners with low loan-to-value ratios. Lamont and Stein (1999) examine the 
9 
sensitivity of housing prices to household income changes across US cities and find 
that housing prices are more sensitive to changes in city-level GDP in years when 
homeowners in a particular city have higher debt. Almeida et al. (2006) find that 
housing prices are more sensitive to aggregate income shocks in countries with higher 
maximum LTV ratios. Their results indicate that in countries like the UK, where the 
LTV ratio is around 90%, housing prices decrease by over 1.2% in the first year 
following a 1% decrease in per capita GDP, and housing prices in Italy where the LTV 
ratio is around 60%, decreases by only 0.8% following a 1% decline in per capita GDP. 
Duca et al. (2011) examine the relationship between housing prices and credit 
constraints in the U.S. and find that a 10 percentage point drop in LTV ratio for first-
time buyers is associated with a 10 percentage point decline in housing price 
appreciation rates.  
 
3.2. The impact of transaction taxes  
3.2.1. The impact of transaction taxes on residential mobility  
A few theoretical papers have shown that transaction taxes in the housing market may 
create significant lock-in effects, and thus reducing housing transactions. Englund 
(1986) studies the effect of transaction costs, particularly in the form of capital gains 
taxes, on the housing demand. Their findings show that higher transaction costs create 
lock-in effects. Lundborg and Skedinger (1999) incorporate transaction taxes into 
Wheaton’s housing market search model and find that both seller tax and buyer tax 
unambiguously create lock-in effects. The lock-in effects are much larger at low 
vacancy rates, i.e. when the housing market is tight.  
 
The empirical studies draw a more or less consistent conclusion with the theoretical 
papers. Cunningham and Engelhardt (2008) exploits the natural experiment of the 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97) in the U.S. to estimate the impact of housing 
capital gains taxation on residential mobility. Specifically, TRA97 eliminates the age-
55 rule, which allows individuals to claim a one-time exclusion of $125,000 if they 
are over age 55, and introduces a new capital gains exclusion of $500,000 from taxable 
income. Their estimates suggest that the enactment of TRA97 raises the mobility rate 
by approximately 1-1.4 percentage points, which represents an increase in the mobility 
rate of homeowners in their early 50s by 22-31%, across a variety of specifications. 
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Ommeren and Leuvensteijn (2005) evaluate the effects of ad valorem transaction taxes 
on household residential mobility in the Netherlands and find that such buyer taxes 
have a strong negative effect on the owners’ probability of moving. It appears that a 
one-percentage increase in the value of transaction costs (as a percentage of the home 
value) decreases the residential mobility rates by at least 8 percent. Besley et al. (2014) 
exploit a natural experiment of the 2008-09 stamp duty holiday in the UK to estimate 
the impacts of stamp duty tax on housing transactions and prices. Their results show a 
significant, but short-lived increase of 8% in transactions for housings affected by the 
tax holiday. Dachis et al. (2012) employ a regression discontinuity design to identify 
the effects of an imposition of a Land Transfer Tax in early 2008 on the sale or 
purchase of properties in Toronto. Their result shows that a 1.1% tax generated a 15% 
decline in transaction volumes as well as a drop in housing prices equivalent to the 
property tax. 
 
3.2.2. The distortions to the distribution of housing prices and transactions 
There are a few of recent studies focusing on examining the distortions in the 
distribution of housing prices and transactions in the housing market. Best and Kleven 
(2013) examine the housing market responses to the stamp duty land tax in the U.K 
and show that the stamp duty schedule causes large bunching below notch points 
combined with large holes above notch points. They also notice that housing prices 
respond by a factor of 2-5 times the size of tax increase at the notch. Hilber and 
Lyytikainen (2013) also estimates the UK stamp duty land tax on household mobility 
and observe the bunching of transaction prices at the cut-off points where the tax rates 
jump. Kopczuk and Munroe (2014) study the incidence of a tax on transacted houses 
with prices above $1 million in New York and New Jersey, U.S.. They find robust 
evidence of substantial bunching for transactions below the threshold of the tax 
schedule. They further indicate that notched taxes cause sellers local to threshold to 
take large prices cuts. They conclude that such taxes crowd out productive transactions 
and increase search-related inefficiencies. Slemrod et al. (2014) estimate the 
behavioral response to residential real estate transfer taxes by studying the notched tax 
rate changes in Washington D.C., in U.S. Their paper provides empirical evidence that 
there exists transaction bunching in the lower-tax-rate region around the price notch 
where the sales prices are manipulated. Leung et al. (2014) investigate the impact of 
11 
stamp duty in Hong Kong’s housing market. Their empirical results show that 
transaction taxes distort the housing trading volume as the transactions bunch at the 
cutoff prices of the stamp duty schedules. They also show the properties sold at and 
right below the certain cutoff prices are normally underpriced in order to reduce the 
tax obligations. 
 
To sum up, the existing studies provide important insights with respect to the impacts 
of credit constraints and transaction taxes on transaction volumes and prices in the 
housing market. Those papers draw a consistent conclusion that both credit constraints 
and transaction taxes have negative effects on the residential mobility. Besides, the 
transaction taxes, particularly the non-linear stamp duty schedule, cause distortions to 
the distribution of housing prices and transactions as the buyers seek to decrease the 
tax obligations. However, the existing empirical studies are overwhelmingly skewed 
towards the western cases, while the role of such factors in Asian housing markets are 
less intensively studied. Further, the assessment of the cooling measures following the 
Global Financial Crisis since 2009 are understudied in general. In addition, the recent 
literature on the distortions to the distribution of housing prices and transactions all 
focus on the ad valorem stamp duty, while the possible consequences of other real 
estate transaction taxes have not been considered yet. Therefore, this paper attempts 
to complement the existing literature in the following two aspects. Firstly, we evaluate 
the impact of the cooling measures which create the down-payment constraints for the 
households and heighten the transaction tax in Hong Kong’s residential re-sale market, 
another vibrant housing market in Asia. Secondly, we provide new micro-evidence on 
the market reaction to another form of real estate transaction taxes, the special stamp 
duty. 
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Chapter 4. Research Questions and Data  
4.1. Research Questions 
This thesis complements the existing literature by evaluating the impacts of the recent 
cooling measures, which have been understudied, as well as providing micro-level 
evidence on the market reaction to the special stamp duty, which targets short-term 
speculators in Hong Kong’s residential re-sale market. Essentially, we attempt to 
answer the following two key research questions: 
(i) Whether and to what extent the cooling measures will affect the trading activity in 
Hong Kong’s residential real estate market?  
 If so, do they generate heterogeneous impacts in various submarkets with 
different qualities? 
(ii) Whether the special stamp duty will cause any distortions to the distribution of 
housing prices and transactions? 
 
In terms of the classification of the submarkets, we follow the Rating and Valuation 
Department of Hong Kong and sub-divide the private domestic units into five 
submarkets based on the saleable area of the unit, i.e. submarket A, B, C, D and E 
(Figure 5). The five submarkets represent different types of housings with various 
qualities across a housing ladder (Ho, et. al. 2008). A housing ladder is a widely used 
term to describe an individual or household’s lifetime progress travelling from the 
cheaper homes, which are normally at the bottom of the ladder, to the more expensive 
ones at the top of the ladder. The housing units in submarkets A and B are commonly 
regarded as starter homes for the first-time buyers (particularly, submarket A) and 
those in submarkets C, D and E are upper ladder homes for the upgraders (Figure 5). 
It should be noted that we merge the submarket D and E into one single market 
segment, submarket DE in our empirical analysis for two main reasons: 1) Both 
submarkets are normally considered as the luxury market segment. 2) The number of 
transactions in submarket E can be very low at monthly frequency. Therefore, four 
submarkets are generated for the following analysis. There are three main reasons why 
we use saleable area as a classifying factor. First, housing size is the most 
straightforward method to categorize the housing units. Secondly, Dale-Johnson and 
Phillips (1984) have argued that housing size contributes most to the capital gain of a 
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property. Finally, Hong Kong, as one of the most densely-populated areas in the world, 
it is well known that housing size is among the most important attributes to the value 
of a property.  
 
4.2. Data  
In this thesis, we use two datasets spanning the period of 1997M1 to 2016M6, 
including two episodes, namely, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998 and the 
Global Financial Crisis in 2007-2008. The large disaggregate dataset comprising 
479,258 transaction records will be utilized to investigate the impact of those cooling 
measures, including the impact on the trading activity and the market reaction to the 
special stamp duty. The aggregate dataset, which constitutes aggregated monthly 
transaction volume and the housing price index of the residential re-sale market will 
be used in the non-linear models in order to capture their regime switching behaviors. 
Statistic summaries will be provided.  
 
4.2.1. The disaggregate dataset 
The analysis of the policy impact is based on a rich disaggregate dataset with a wide 
spread of cross-sectional properties. Specifically, over 1 million housing transactions 
comprising both primary and secondary transactions are retrieved from Midland 
Realty, a leading property agency in Hong Kong 7 . The company compiles all 
transaction records from a government authority, Land Registry. The following 
transactions are excluded from our analysis: 1) The transactions occurred either in a 
pre-sale market or a spot primary market since our research focus is on secondary 
residential market; 2) The estates with small housing stock are also excluded, which 
ensures that all the estates included for analysis have transactions in each month during 
our sample period. Thus, the consolidation screening leaves us with 479,258 
transaction records of 125 estates in Hong Kong. The transactions cover the period 
from 1st January, 1997 to 30th June, 2016. For each transaction, we observe the date of 
transaction, the date of last transaction, transaction price, property attributes (floor 
level, gross size and salable size) and the attributes of the estate (location and estate 
completion date). We also collect the housing stock of each estate from Midland 
                                                     
7 Midland website: http://proptx.midland.com.hk/utx/default.jsp?lang=en; 
We use Python to scrap all the transaction records from the above website.  
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Realty8, which will be used for the purpose of measuring the trading activity of each 
estate. We then merge the housing stock dataset with the disaggregate dataset.  
 
4.2.2. The aggregate dataset  
The aggregate dataset includes the monthly transactions and the monthly housing price 
index (HPI) over the period of 1997M1-2016M6. The aggregated monthly transactions 
are achieved by aggregating the transactions across the estates in each month from the 
consolidated disaggregate dataset. The housing price index9 is quality adjusted and 
compiled by the Rating and Valuation Department (RVD) of Hong Kong. It should be 
noted that the public sector developments, including domestic units built under the 
Private Sector Participation Scheme for subsidized sale, and all units built under the 
Home Ownership, Buy or Rent Option, Mortgage Subsidy, Sandwich Class Housing, 
Urban Improvement and Flat-for-Sale Schemes are not included. Further, rental estates 
built by the Housing Authority and Housing Society, units sold under the Tenants 
Purchase Scheme, and Government-owned quarters are also excluded. Besides, both 
pre-sale and primary sales are also excluded from the index calculation.  
 
4.2.3. Economic and financial variables  
The macroeconomic and financial variables including exports, unemployment rate, 
Hang Seng Index and best lending rate will be included as control variables in the 
model. Those variables are widely considered as important factors in influencing the 
dynamics of the housing market in many existing literature (Peek and Wilcox, 1991; 
Hort,1998; Capozza, et. al., 2002). Exports are used as a proxy of income since Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) is not available at monthly frequency. The monthly exports 
and unemployment rate included in the model are seasonally adjusted. Hang Seng 
Index is used to capture the investors’ sentiment. The best lending rate is used to reflect 
the cost of borrowing. The data of exports and unemployment rate is retrieved from 
Census and Statistics of Hong Kong. Hang Seng Index is obtained from Yahoo 
Finance10, and the best lending rate is collected from Hong Kong Monetary Authority. 
Apart from that, we also include other controls in order to capture the effects of the 
                                                     
8 The housing stock of each estate can be obtained in the “Estate Page” of Midland’s website 
9 The RVD controls the quality heterogeneity of the units by taking the ratable value of each unit into consideration. The construction of the 
index will be elaborated in the appendix.  
10 https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/%5EHSI/history?p=%5EHSI 
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external shocks, such as the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997-1998, Hong Kong’s 
Tenant Purchase Scheme11 (TPS) starting from late 1997 and ending in late 2002, and 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2007-2008.  
 
4.2.4. Summary statistics  
The summary statistics of the sample of the disaggregate dataset are reported in Panel 
A of Table 1. For the entire sample, the average transaction price (in nominal term) of 
a flat costs HKD 3.156 million and the average flat size is around 532 square feet. The 
average floor level and age of a flat are 19 and 14 respectively. The summary statistics 
of the sample of the aggregate dataset are reported in Panel B of Table 1. The average 
monthly transaction in the selected sample period is 4,007 and the annualized price 
return12 is 4.6%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
11 The scheme, allowing tenants in public estates to buy their flats at deeply discounted prices, was initiated in December 1997 and suspended in 
November 2002. According to Ho and Wong (2006), the adverse effects of this scheme to the housing trading activity and prices are even more 
pronounced than the Asian Financial Crisis. 
12 The annualized price return refers to the price return at month t with respect to the same month in previous year.   
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Chapter 5. Model Specification and Measurement  
In this study, we will first adopt a standard static panel model to examine the impact 
of the cooling measures, i.e. the mortgage tightening measure and the stamp duty 
measure, on trading activity in Hong Kong’s residential re-sale market. Second, an 
ordinary least square (OLS) method will be employed in order to study the behavioral 
responses to the special stamp duty, a transaction tax imposed on short-term disposals 
of properties. In addition, a smooth transition autoregressive model (STAR) suggested 
by Terasvirta (1994) and a self-exciting threshold autoregressive model (SETAR) 
proposed by Tsay (1989) will be utilized to model the dynamics of the market 
indicators, i.e. transaction volumes and price returns. The purpose of employing the 
non-linear models is to capture the regime switching behaviors of both indicators 
following the policy intervention.  
 
5.1. The impact on trading activity  
5.1.1. Model specification  
A standard static panel model is used to examine the impact of the cooling measures 
on the trading activity in various market segments. The model can be specified as 
follows,  
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽3′𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                      (Eqn. 1)                                             
The dependent variable 𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑛  refers to the trading activity of estate i at time t in a 
specified market n. n includes the overall market, the submarkets classified by home 
salable size (A, B, C and DE) and the submarket in which only speculative trading 
activity is considered. The two policy variables, 𝑀𝑇𝑡 and 𝑆𝐷𝑡, in the model represent 
the mortgage tightening measure and stamp duty measure, respectively. The variable 
𝑋𝑡 , represents the macroeconomic and financial control variables as well as the 
external shocks including AFC in 1997-1998, TPS in 1997-2002 and GFC in 2007-
2008. 𝑍𝑖 controls for time-invariant estate-level characteristics.  
 
5.1.2. Measurement  
We use turnover as the measurement of the trading activity in our model. Transaction 
volumes and turnover are the two common measurements of the trading activity in the 
real estate market. Ho (2003), Leung et al. (2002) and Yiu et al. (2009) use transaction 
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volumes to measure the frequency of the trading activity in Hong Kong’s housing 
market. Tu et al. (2009) and Fu and Qian (2014) utilize turnover as a proxy of liquidity 
in Singapore’s housing market. Wong et al. (2012) and Zheng (2013) also uses 
turnover to measure the liquidity in Hong Kong’s housing market. However, Miller et 
al. (2011) claims that housing turnover is a better indicator in measuring home sales 
than the number of housing transactions, because a large estate (i.e. more housing 
stock) is more likely to have a lager magnitude of housing transactions. Therefore, we 
follow Miller et al. (2001) and use turnover to measure the trading activity in this thesis.  
 
The turnover for a specific estate is estimated as the number of transactions of each 
estate within a given time interval (each month in this thesis) divided by the 
corresponding total stock of that estate:  
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =
(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)𝑖,𝑡
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘)𝑖
 
Where the subscript 𝑖  and 𝑡  represent the estate and the calendar month, 
respectively.  
 
The two policy variables, 𝑀𝑇𝑡 and 𝑆𝐷𝑡, are constructed as step function variables
13, 
which allow us to capture the tightening process of each round of the measure. 
Specifically, each policy variable equals zero when there are no measures introduced 
and increases by one for each new round of measure tightening at time 𝑡. Given that 
seven rounds of mortgage tightening measures are imposed, the value of the policy 
variable, 𝑀𝑇𝑡, can reach as high as 7. Similarly, the policy variable, 𝑆𝐷𝑡 can reach 
the value up to 3 since there are three rounds of stamp duty measure in total. This kind 
of measurement helps deal with the problem of multicollinearity if separate dummy 
variables are generated in order to capture the effect of each round of tightening. In 
terms of the external shocks, it should be noted that we use the dummy variables to 
capture the aforementioned external shocks.  
 
 
 
                                                     
13 The step function approach is firstly adopted to model the intensity of prudential measures in Krznar and Morsink (2014).  
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5.2. Behavioral response to special stamp duty  
5.2.1. Model specification  
In order to identify the impact of the special stamp duty on buyer and seller’s behavior, 
we restrict our sample to the properties which were obtained since the introduction of 
the special stamp duty, i.e. the properties were purchased and resold between 20 Nov 
2010 and 30 Jun 2016 which is the end of our sample period. Such restriction makes 
sure that all the properties included face the same tax environment. Specifically, we 
study how the transaction prices of properties behave in response to the special stamp 
duty tax and the model is specified in the following simple generic form:  
𝑃𝑗,𝑡
𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝐷 + 𝜇𝑗,𝑡                                         (Eqn. 2) 
𝑗  and 𝑡  represent the property and the transaction time, respectively. 𝑃𝑗,𝑡
𝑐  is 
interpreted as the “quality-controlled” housing price of property 𝑗 at time 𝑡, which is 
the residual from the hedonic regression. 𝑆𝑆𝐷 is an indicator that equals 1 if property 
𝑗 is subject to the special stamp duty tax and 0 otherwise. Given that there are two 
rounds of the special stamp duty under which the holding periods of properties for 
imposition of the special stamp duty are different, we construct our regressor of 
interest, 𝑆𝑆𝐷 in the following procedure. For the properties which were obtained 
during the first round of special stamp duty, i.e. between 20 Nov 2010 and 26 Oct 2012 
(all inclusive), 𝑆𝑆𝐷 takes the value of 1 if property 𝑗 is disposed within 24 months 
since the last acquisition. Likewise, 𝑆𝑆𝐷 is set to be 1 if property 𝑗 was purchased 
after 26 Oct 2012 and disposed within 36 months since those properties are subject to 
the second round of the special stamp duty. For the rest of properties with longer 
holding periods, 𝑆𝑆𝐷  is equal to 0. Holding period 14  is calculated as the time 
difference between the recent transaction date and the last transaction date of property 
𝑗 in this thesis. The coefficient 𝛽 of the regressor, 𝑆𝑆𝐷, in Eqn (2) is our interest, 
which measures the effect of the special stamp duty on the transaction prices of 
properties which are subject to the tax payment relative to the properties which are not.  
 
 
                                                     
14 We do admit the caveat in the calculation of the holding period in our thesis. In practice, the holding period counts from the first agreement 
including the provisional sales and purchase agreement and there could be lag between the signing date of the provisional sales and purchase 
agreement and the registration date of the formal sales and purchase agreement. However, we are unable to observe the date when the provisional 
sales and purchase agreement is signed. Therefore, we simply use the time difference between the two registered formal agreements.   
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5.2.2. Hedonic pricing  
The “quality-controlled” housing price, 𝑃𝑗,𝑡
𝑐 , is measured by adopting the hedonic 
pricing approach which has been commonly used to control for the heterogeneity of 
housing units (Rosen, 1974). In each period, a cross-sectional hedonic pricing model, 
which regresses the real transaction prices with the corresponding attributes of the 
transacted housing units, is estimated (Eqn. (3)). The residual from the regression is 
interpreted as the “quality-controlled” housing price specific to property 𝑗 at time 𝑡. 
Notice that the hedonic pricing equation is estimated independently in each month so 
that it is not only controlled for the heterogeneity of the housing units, but also takes 
into consideration the fluctuations of the implicit prices of different housing attributes 
over the time period (Leung et al. 2006). For each period, the hedonic pricing model 
is estimated as follows:  
𝑃𝑗,𝑡
𝑟 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗
2 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 (Eqn. 3) 
Where 𝑃𝑗,𝑡
𝑟  is the real transaction price of property 𝑗 at time 𝑡, and empirically the 
real price of each unit is defined as: 𝑃𝑗,𝑡
𝑟 =
𝑃𝑗,𝑡
𝑛
𝐶𝑃𝐼
 , where 𝑃𝑗,𝑡
𝑛  refers to the nominal 
transaction price of the unit and CPI15 is the Consumer Price Index at that particular 
time period. Size, Floor and Age measure the effects of salable area, floor level and 
building age respectively. The square term of the salable area is intended to capture its 
marginal decreasing effect of the unit size. 𝐸𝑖 denotes the external attributes of each 
estate including swimming pools, proximity to subways , proximity to seas or waters 
and shopping malls. 𝑅𝑖 denotes the district where the estate locates, i.e. Hong Kong 
Island, Kowloon or New Territory.  
 
5.3. Transaction and price adjustment process  
5.3.1. Model specification  
According to Muellbauer and Murphy (1997), the presence of lumpy transaction costs 
can result in important nonlinearities or threshold effects in the aggregate demand for 
housing. We therefore, model the process of transactions and housing prices by 
employing non-linear models, which allow for parameters changing in the model. 
Those non-linear models enable us to describe the dynamics of both market indicators 
                                                     
15 Consumer Price Index (CPI) is obtained from Hong Kong Monetary Authority.  
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in the long run, as well as identify possible regime switches caused by the recent 
government measures or other external shocks. We firstly employ the STAR model 
which allows the dynamics of variables to evolve with a smooth transition between 
regimes. Based on Terasvirta (1994), the STAR model for a univariate time series 
𝑦𝑡 is specified in the following form.  
𝑦𝑡 = (𝛼
0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
0𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 ) + (𝛼
1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
1𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 ) ∙ 𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑐) + 𝜀𝑡         (Eqn. 3)  
Where 𝑦𝑡  refers to the total number of monthly transactions 𝑇𝑡  or annual price 
returns 𝑅𝑡. Superscript 0 and 1 refer to the coefficients of the linear and nonlinear part 
of the model, respectively. 𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑐) is a continuous transition function that controls 
the regime-switching mechanism and bounded between 0 to 1. The transition function 
could take either the logistic form or the exponential form. The logistic STAR model 
is usually applied to two-regime cases, while in the cases where more than two regimes 
are identified, the exponential STAR model should be used.  
A first-order logistic function can be written in the form as: 
𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑐) = (1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝{−𝛾(𝑠𝑡 − 𝑐)})
−1, 𝛾 > 0                       (Eqn. 4) 
A typical exponential function can be written in the following form:  
𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑐) = 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝{−𝛾(𝑠𝑡 − 𝑐)
2}, 𝛾 > 0                          (Eqn. 5)  
Where 𝑠𝑡 denotes the transition variable that triggers a movement from one regime 
to another and is assumed to be a lagged endogenous variable, that is, 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡−𝑑 and 
𝑑  is the delay parameter which shows the number of periods that the transition 
variable leads the switch in dynamics. The adjustment parameter 𝛾 determines the 
speed of the transition from 0 to 1 and 𝑐  is the threshold value of the transition 
variable at which the transition occurs.  
 
According to Dijk et, al. (2002), in the case that the adjustment parameter 𝛾 is very 
large16, indicating that the switch between two regimes is sharp, the model becomes a 
self-exciting threshold autoregressive model (SETAR), a special case of TAR model. 
                                                     
16 We note that the size of γ depends on the dimension of the model variables. “Large” is typically interpreted as larger than 10 for the standardized 
value of γ, which is calculated as the value of γ divided by the sample standard deviation of the transition variable, s. 
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Under the SETAR model, the transition function 𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑐)  approaches to an 
indicator function I (𝑠𝑡>c), and takes the value of 1 if the condition in the bracket is 
fulfilled, and 0 otherwise. We thus further specify a SETAR model.  
𝑦𝑡 = {
𝛽10 + 𝛽11𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜇1𝑡    𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡 < 𝑐
𝛽20 + 𝛽21𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜇2𝑡    𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡 ≥ 𝑐
                               (Eqn. 6) 
Figure 8 illustrates the logistic and exponential transition functions of varying values 
of the adjustment parameter, 𝛾. The values of the transition functions G are plotted 
against the transition variable, 𝑠𝑡. The left-hand graph relates to the two-regime cases 
of Equation (5), while the right-hand graph relates to the cases of Equation (6). Each 
of the graph contains three separate plots with different values of the adjustment 
parameter, 𝛾, i.e. 2, 5 and 10. The threshold value 𝑐 is set to be 0 in both equations. 
Comparing between the two transition functions, the logistic function is changing 
monotonically with 𝑦𝑡−𝑑, while the exponential function is changing symmetrically 
at 𝑐 with 𝑦𝑡−𝑑. Both graphs reveal that a larger value of 𝛾 is related to a steeper 
function, which means that larger 𝛾  contributes to faster transition between the 
regimes.  
 
To specify the STAR model, we follow a systematic testing and selection procedure 
suggested by Terasvirta (1994). (i) Specify a linear AR model of order p for the time 
series using an appropriate model selection criterion. (ii) Test the null hypothesis of 
linearity against the alternative of STAR nonlinearity. If linearity is rejected, select the 
transition variable with the delay parameter, 𝑑, that has the strongest power to reject 
the null hypothesis. (iii) Choose between LSTAR and ESTAR.  
 
5.3.2. Measurement  
We use the nominal monthly housing price index in the secondary residential market 
for the non-linear model construction. The housing price index is quality adjusted by 
taking the rateable value17 of a property into consideration and is compiled by the 
Rating and Valuation Department of Hong Kong. The details of the price index 
construction will be elaborated in the appendix. The use of nominal housing price is 
in accordance with the findings of Genesove and Mayer (2001) who suggest that 
                                                     
17 Rateable value of a property is an estimate of its annual rental at a reference date. 
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sellers are averse to realizing nominal losses. Therefore it is the nominal housing price 
changes that determine seller’s behavior in the housing market. 
 
The monthly data on macroeconomic time series are known to be noisy. Therefore, we 
use the annual growth rate of housing price, which is measured as the growth rate at 
month 𝑡  with respect to the same month in the previous year. Terasvirta and 
Anderson (1992) and Kim and Bhattacharya (2009) have a similar transformation of 
various macro time series. The price return can be denoted as follows: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 = 𝐿𝑛 (
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−12
) 
Where 𝑃𝑡 refers to the quality-controlled housing price index at month 𝑡, which is 
compiled by the Rating and Valuation Department of Hong Kong. 𝑃𝑡−12 denotes the 
quality-adjusted price index 12 months earlier.  
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Chapter 6. Empirical Results 
6.1. The impact on trading activity 
6.1.1. The impact in overall market  
We first investigate the influence of the two measures on the total turnover at estate 
level in the overall market for the sample period of 1997M1-2016M6. The dependent 
variable is the estate-specific overall turnover, defined as the total number of monthly 
transactions divided by estate size, where estate size refers to the total housing stock 
of each estate. Column (1) of Table 2 gives the estimates of both policy variables. The 
mortgage tightening measure shows a positive but statistically insignificant effect on 
the trading activity in the overall market, indicating that the mortgage tightening 
measure does not effectively reduce the demand for properties in the residential re-
sale market. The stamp duty measure, on the other hand, is associated with an 
approximate 0.184 percentage point reduction in the monthly overall turnover in the 
overall market, and the effect is statistically significant at 1% level. All the control 
variables have the expected signs and are statistically significant at the 1% level. Both 
the estate fixed effect and the seasonal variations are controlled. The result suggests 
that the stamp duty measure has a more prominent impact on reducing the trading 
activity in the residential market compared to the mortgage tightening tool. Column 
(2) in Table 2 provides a sensitivity check based on the sub-sample which is from 
2006M1 to 2015M12. The sub-sample excludes the volatile time period when the 
housing market was severely hit by the AFC and TPS. The estimates of both measures 
remain robust to the restricted sub-sample as the coefficient of the mortgage tightening 
measure continues to be insignificant while the magnitude of the stamp duty measure 
is slightly changed.  
 
We also test the effectiveness of both measures in deterring the speculative trading 
activities since one of the major purposes of the cooling measures is to combat 
speculators, particularly the transaction taxes. We use the frequency of property 
transactions which are disposed within 24 months since their last acquisitions to proxy 
the speculative trading activity. Fu et al. (2013) find that speculators in the pre-sale 
housing market hold their investments for about 24 months on average. However, we 
do admit that such proxy could be rough since the short-term re-sales may also include 
the genuine home buyers who need to fire sale their properties due to unexpected 
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financial circumstances. The dependent variable is the speculative turnover at estate 
level, denoted as the total monthly transactions with the holding period no more than 
24 months as a proportion of estate size. Column (3) of Table 2 displays the estimates 
of the effects of both measures on speculative turnover. The result shows that the 
mortgage tightening measure does not have any statistically significant impact on 
deterring speculative trading activity, while the coefficient of stamp duty measure 
turns out negative and statistically significant at 1% level. The increased transaction 
tax is associated with a reduction in speculative trading activity of around 0.039 
percentage points. The finding suggests that the punitive transaction tax which 
imposes additional cost on speculators plays a major role in combating the short-term 
speculators. On the contrary, the mortgage tightening measure which requires larger 
amount of down-payment does not effectively deter speculators, since this measure 
does not directly affect or increase the monetary cost for a home purchase, except for 
the time value of the money. The sensitivity check in Column (4) of Table 2 shows a 
larger coefficient estimate for the restricted sub-sample, 2006-2016, implying that the 
speculative activities are less rampant before 2006 possibly due to a few shocks, such 
as AFC in1997-1998, Hong Kong’s TPS which lasts for quite a few years from 1998-
2003 and several rounds of federal rate raising in U.S. in 2005. The result indicates 
that the government does achieve its intended goal in terms of deterring the speculators. 
 
Column (5) of Table 2 shows that the drop in overall turnover in the overall market is 
more prominent in the estates where more speculators are in presence before the 
introduction of stamp duty measure. We follow a similar way constructed by Fu et al. 
(2013) to proxy for the presence of the speculators in each estate before the 
intervention. Specifically, the average speculative turnover for each estate (“Pre-
policy speculation”), which is the average of the speculative trading activity prior to 
the introduction of stamp duty measure in November 2010 (from 1997M1 to 
2010M10), is utilized to proxy for the presence of short-term speculators. We then 
interact it with the SD policy variable to capture the effect of stamp duty measure on 
the total turnover of the estates with higher presence of speculative trading activity 
before the policy intervention. The finding reveals that the estates experience larger 
reduction in trading activity if more speculators were in presence before the 
intervention of the stamp duty measure. The estate with 1 percentage point greater 
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speculative trading activity prior to the intervention experiences an additional 22.4 
percentage point decline in the total trading activity in the overall market. This result 
further confirms that the stamp duty measure has a substantial negative impact on 
short-term speculative trading activity.  
 
6.1.2. The impact in submarkets  
We further test the magnitude of the effects of both measures in four submarkets (A, 
B, C and DE) in order to check the heterogeneous impacts across the housing ladder. 
The dependent variables are the estate-specific turnover of submarket A, B, C and DE, 
defined as the monthly transactions of specified property units scaled by estate size. 
Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) of Table 3 report the estimates for submarkets A, B, C 
and DE over the whole sample period, respectively. The mortgage tightening measure 
generates heterogeneous impacts to the four submarkets. Specifically, the mortgage 
tightening measure leads to higher trading activity of around 0.033 percentage points 
in submarket A, while generating a statistically insignificant impact on the trading 
activity in submarket B. On the contrary, the mortgage tightening measure is 
associated with a lower monthly trading activity of roughly 0.013 and 0.023 
percentage points in submarket C and DE, respectively. The results suggest that the 
mortgage tightening measure, mainly targeting the higher-end property buyers, 
changes the property purchasing behavior of households by forcing a proportion of 
relatively well-off buyers to purchase lower-priced properties due to the restriction of 
down-payment. As a result, the demand for higher-end properties (the properties in 
submarket C and DE) is suppressed, while the demand for lower-end properties, 
especially units in submarket A which are not heavily restricted by the measure, soars. 
Besides, the heterogeneous impacts of this measure in submarkets help to explain its 
insignificant impact in the overall trading activity in the overall market, indicating that 
the measure does not lead to lower overall demand for housing units, but distorts the 
market by forcing the home buyers to buy smaller-sized homes. This increases the per 
square foot price of housing and motivates developers to supply so-called nano-flats. 
 
The coefficient estimate of the stamp duty measure shows that the heightened 
transaction tax is associated with a lower monthly trading activity of approximately 
0.171, 0.110 and 0.015, percentage points in submarket A, B and C, respectively. The 
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impact of the measure on the luxury market segment, submarket DE, is statistically 
insignificant. The widespread negative impacts in submarkets A, B and C suggest that 
the stamp duty measure creates significant lock-in effect, which is consistent with most 
of the existing literature about the effects of transaction taxes on residential mobility. 
The result also suggests that the trading activity in submarkets A and B experiences 
larger reduction compared to the other segments, implying that the drop in trading 
activity in the overall market is predominantly driven by the shrinkage in these two 
submarkets. In addition, the substantial decline in trading activity in submarkets A and 
B (especially in submarket A) also indicates a higher presence of short-term 
speculative trading activities before the intervention. This implies that the short-term 
speculators often target small-sized units, since those units require less capital 
investment and are easier to sell.  
 
Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) of Table 3 show the estimates of the policy variables in 
respective submarkets under the restricted sub-sample from 2006M1 to 2015M12. The 
results of each submarket estimated from the restricted sub-sample are in line with the 
estimates of the whole sample. The magnitudes of the coefficients are slightly changed.  
 
The opposite effects of both measures on trading activity in submarket A and the 
unanimously negative effects of both measures in higher-end submarkets provide a 
piece of empirical evidence on the abnormal pattern in price dynamics in various 
submarkets as displayed in Figure 6 which illustrates the historical movements of the 
housing price indices in submarkets A and DE. Since the government intervention in 
late 2009, the price appreciation rate in submarket A has been faster than that in the 
higher-end submarkets. Further, the housing price index of units in submarket A has 
outstripped its counterparts in submarket DE since the beginning of 2013. The possible 
root cause is the even more imbalanced demand and supply in submarket A. On one 
hand, the mortgage tightening measure dampens the financial leverage of households, 
and thus leading them to purchase smaller-sized apartments. On the other hand, the 
stamp duty measure further restricts the supply of small-sized units. Wheaton (1990) 
points out that moving houses most of the time means both selling a house and buying 
another one. Therefore, when the stamp duty measure prevents households from 
upgrading to higher-end apartments frequently, the supply of the secondary homes will 
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be substantially reduced. The finding suggests that the impact of stamp duty measure 
is the largest in submarket A, implying a relatively more restricted supply in this 
particular segment. Consequently, the market becomes even tighter in submarket A in 
terms of the ratio of the number of buyers to the number of sellers (Novy-Marx, 2009), 
which unambiguously pushes up the price in this segment as a result. On the contrary, 
both measures reduce the demand for higher-end properties, and thus causing a slower 
price growth rate in the luxury segment, which is consistent with the three streams of 
theories on price and transaction relationship. The three theories are Stein’s down-
payment theory, Wheaton’s frictional search theory and Genesove and Mayer’s loss 
aversion theory, which all suggest that housing price and transaction are positively 
correlated in the housing market. 
 
However, the abnormal pattern in terms of the price appreciation rates in the 
submarkets (Class A versus Class DE) following the government intervention in Hong 
Kong, is contrary to the findings from most of the existing literature on the price 
differential between smaller-sized and larger-sized homes or lower-valued and higher-
valued properties in different regions. Most scholars (Seward et al. (1992), Smith and 
Teserak (1991), Poterba (1991), and Mayer (1993)) find that high-priced properties 
appreciate at a faster rate than the low-priced ones. Kiel and Carson (1990) also 
suggest that larger houses experience higher rates of appreciation. Zheng (2013) draws 
a consistent conclusion by showing that the larger home classes (Class C, D and E) 
yield higher returns than smaller counterparts (Class A and B) in Hong Kong over the 
period of 1991 to 2011. Ho et al. (2008) find the existence of domino effects within a 
housing market where the housing price changes transmit from the low quality tier to 
higher quality tiers. Therefore, the mortgage tightening measure, in conjunction with 
the stamp duty measure, creates preverse effects by further inflating the housing prices 
in small-sized market segment, which is detrimental to the first-time buyers, most of 
whom normally can only afford small-sized units.  
 
6.2. Behavioral response to special stamp duty 
6.2.1. Price response   
Columns (1)-(2) of Table 4 report the regression results for the model specification in 
Eqn. (2) which captures the effect of the special stamp duty on the transaction prices 
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of properties which are subject to the SSD tax duty relative to those which are not 
required to pay such tax. Column (1) displays the coefficient estimate of our regressor 
of interest, 𝑆𝑆𝐷. The result shows that the transaction prices of properties with SSD 
tax duty are 6.8 percentage points lower on average compared to those without SSD 
tax duty. The effect is statistically significant at 5% level. Since both the buyer and 
seller are jointly liable to pay the SSD, we provide two possible explanations for the 
lower transaction prices from the perspective of the both parties separately. If the buyer 
and seller reaches an agreement that the buyer is responsible for the payment of SSD, 
the seller are willing to cut the property prices so that the buyer bears lower tax 
obligations and the transaction can be facilitated. Such behavior is categorized as tax 
avoidance. In fact, in any efficient bargaining between the buyer and seller, the buyer 
paying stamp duty can maximize a surplus of a transaction since this can minimize the 
price of a transaction written in the sale and purchase agreement and thus lower the 
tax amount paid to the tax bureaus. In the other scenario where the seller bears the tax 
responsibility, there might be the “off the book compensation” between the buyer and 
the seller. Under such circumstances, the seller has the incentive to artificially cut the 
property price in order to reduce his or her tax obligation and find other ways for the 
compensation from the buyer “off the record”. Particularly, since most of the vendors 
involved in the short-term re-sales are the speculators, they should be more eager to 
achieve such agreement with the buyer. Some of the buyers may also have the 
motivation to do so since lower transaction price written in the sale and purchase 
agreement means lower transaction costs which is calculated as a percentage of the 
total consideration of the property, especially for the multiple home holders18 who 
face doubled ad valorem stamp duty during our sample period. The relevant 
transaction costs borne by the buyer can reach as high as 9.6%19 of the total property 
value, including the ad valorem stamp duty, solicitor’s fee and real estate agent’s fee. 
Therefore, such agreements are beneficial to both parties of the transaction even 
though it is categorized as tax evasion and the parties involved may face the legal risk 
of being prosecuted. Given that we do not have the record on which party bears the 
tax responsibility, we are unable to distinguish the tax avoidance from tax evasion. 
                                                     
18 The multiple home buyers face a flat rate of 15% ad valorem stamp duty since 5th November 2016.  
19 The rate of the ad valorem stamp duty varies from HK$100 to 8.5% depending on the value of the property and whether the buyer is a first-time 
buyer or a multi-home holder. The solicitor’s fee is normally around 0.1% of the property value and the real estate agent’s fee is often charged at 
1% of the property value.   
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Our result to some extent coincides with the finding of Leung et al. (2015) who suggest 
that the non-linear stamp duty in Hong Kong causes the sellers to cut the price if their 
properties are set at a price slightly above the threshold where the tax rate jumps in 
order to reduce the buyer’s tax obligation.  
 
Admittedly, the short-term re-sales may also include the property disposals by the 
genuine home holders who are in urgent need to sell the property quickly due to the 
unexpected changes in family and financial circumstances. Those property vendors are 
normally more willing to cut the price in exchange for the immediate cash. Therefore, 
the price reduction of such short-term property disposals are not driven by the 
imposition of the special stamp duty. However, such noises would unlikely bias 
against our analysis since the fire sales may also occur in the properties with longer 
holding period.  
  
Column (2) of Table 4 reports the estimate for the sub-sample which only includes the 
properties with holding period no more than 48 months since properties with longer 
holding period may be sold at relatively higher prices. The coefficient estimate is 
slightly changed after we exclude the properties disposed after 48 months since the 
last acquisition. The effect is statistically significant at 5% level.  
 
Column (3) presents the result for the transaction prices of properties which were 
purchased before the introduction of special stamp duty. Specifically, we focus on the 
properties which were obtained between 01 Jan 2009 and 19 Nov 2010 (all inclusive). 
It should be noted that as long as the residential property was acquired before 20 Nov 
2010, the subsequent disposal of that property at any time will not be subject to SSD. 
Our regressor of interest here is 𝐻0−24, which is an indicator variable equal 1 if the 
holding period of a property is within 24 months and 0 otherwise. The coefficient 
estimate of 𝐻0−24 is statistically insignificant, suggesting that there is no significant 
difference in transaction prices between the properties with holing period no more than 
24 months and those with longer holding period. The result further confirms that it is 
the imposition of SSD leads to lower transaction prices of properties which are subject 
to SSD. 
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6.2.2. Transaction bunching  
We further provide graphical evidence on significant bunching in property transactions 
at the notch where the holding period is right after the restricted holding months and 
the tax rate is dropped to 0%. Figure 7 illustrates the density of property transactions 
as a function of holding period before the introduction of SSD, after the first round of 
SSD intervention (SSD1), and after the SSD enhancement (SSD2). The horizontal axis 
refers to the holding period and the bin width is 1 month. The vertical axis is the 
frequency of transactions during the specified sample periods. Figure 7a displays the 
density of transactions against the holding period for the properties which were 
obtained between 1st Jan 2009 and 19th Nov 2010 (all inclusive) versus the density of 
transactions for properties which were purchased between 20th Oct 2010 and 26th Oct 
2012. The decreasing function (circle shaped) in Figure 7a suggests that the frequency 
of transactions reduces in general as the holding period increases before the SSD 
intervention. The number of transactions is extraordinarily high at the time point where 
the holding period is between 3 and 7 months, indicating high presence of speculators 
before the policy intervention. However, such distribution of transactions observed 
prior to the intervention disappears after the introduction of SSD. We instead observe 
a significant transaction bunching right after the threshold (notch point) where the 
holding period is 24 months and the SSD tax rate drops to 0%, combined with low 
transaction frequency at or below the notch point.  
 
Figure 7b compares the distribution of transactions for properies which are affected by 
SSD1 (triangle shaped) versus the distribution of transactions for properties which are 
affected by SSD2 (square shaped), i.e. properties that are bought and resold between 
27th Oct 2012 and 30th Jun 2016. Following the introduction of SSD2, a transaction 
bunching is observed slightly above the notch where the holding period is 36 months, 
in conjunction with a very small amount of transactions at or below the threshold. The 
figure suggests that the notch where the bunching in transactions occurs shifts as the 
government enhances SSD by extending the holding period that is subject to SSD to 
36 months and heightening the tax rate up to 20% in Oct 2012. The transaction 
bunching observed at the notch where the tax rate drops to 0% is consistent with the 
existing literature (e.g. Kopczuk and Munroe, 2014, Leung et al., 2014, Slemrod et al., 
2014), which suggest that the non-linear stamp duty schedule causes transaction 
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bunching at or right below the notch points where the tax rates jump as the buyers seek 
lower tax burden. The plots which compare the distribution of transactions before and 
after the SSD also give evidence to the significant lock-in effect created by the high 
stamp duty tax as the home buyers choose to hold their properties for at least 3 years 
in order to avoid punitive taxes.  
 
6.3. Transaction and price adjustment process  
Following the proposed procedures of Terasvirta (1994), a Logistic STAR model 
(LSTAR) with the transition variable being the fourth lag of the monthly transaction, 
(𝑇𝑡−4), and a LSTAR model of which the first lag of the price return, 𝑅𝑡−1, is the 
transition variable, are employed for our estimation. The estimates of the parameters 
for the transaction and price models are illustrated in Column (1) of Table 5 and Table 
6, respectively. The final LSTAR model specifications are as follows: 
 𝑇𝑡 = 1.21 + 0.89𝑇𝑡−1 − 0.03𝑇𝑡−2 − 0.20𝑇𝑡−3 + 0.18𝑇𝑡−4 + 0.04𝑇𝑡−5 + 0.07𝑇𝑡−6 − 0.09𝑇𝑡−7 
           +(4.00 − 0.15𝑇𝑡−1 − 0.040𝑇𝑡−2 + 0.69𝑇𝑡−3 − 0.40𝑇𝑡−4 − 0.31𝑇𝑡−5 − 0.10𝑇𝑡−6 − 0.14𝑇𝑡−7) 
           [1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝{−100(𝑇𝑡−4 − 8.58)}]
−1 
           +𝜇𝑡                                                                                  (Eqn. 7) 
𝑅𝑡 = −0.01 + 1.52𝑅𝑡−1 − 0.74𝑅𝑡−2 + 0.33𝑅𝑡−3 − 0.18𝑅𝑡−4 
         +(0.02 + 0.04𝑅𝑡−1 + 0.042𝑅𝑡−2 + 0.02𝑅𝑡−3 − 0.13𝑅𝑡−4) 
         [1 + exp{−61.92(𝑅𝑡−1 + 0.01)}]
−1 
         +𝜇𝑡                                                                                  (Eqn. 8) 
Because the estimates of the adjustment parameter 𝛾 for both models (100 in Eqn. (7) 
and 61.92 in Eqn. (8)) indicate a rapid adjustment between regimes, it is suggested to 
also estimate the SETAR model to check the sensitivity of the estimates according to 
Dijk et, al. (2002). The estimates of SETAR model are provided in Column (2) of 
Table 5 and Table 6, respectively. There is relatively little variation in the estimated 
parameters of the two models, including the threshold value, 𝑐. The resilience of the 
estimates can be interpreted as a sign of model robustness. In fact, the Akaike 
Information Criterion favors the SETAR model over the LSTAR model. The final 
SETAR model specifications are as follows: 
𝑇𝑡 = {
1.28 + 0.88𝑇𝑡−1 − 0.03𝑇𝑡−2 − 0.21𝑇𝑡−3 + 0.17𝑇𝑡−4 + 0.05𝑇𝑡−5 + 0.07𝑇𝑡−6 − 0.09𝑇𝑡−7 + 𝜇1𝑡    𝑖𝑓 𝑇𝑡−4 < 8.59
5.25 + 0.73𝑇𝑡−1 − 0.08𝑇𝑡−2 + 0.50𝑇𝑡−3 − 0.23𝑇𝑡−4 − 0.27𝑇𝑡−5 − 0.03𝑇𝑡−6 − 0.02𝑇𝑡−7 + 𝜇2𝑡    𝑖𝑓 𝑇𝑡−4 ≥ 8.59
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𝑅𝑡 = {
−0.01 + 1.52 − 0.73𝑅𝑡−2 + 0. 30𝑅𝑡−3 − 0.17𝑅𝑡−4 + 𝜇1𝑡    𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑡−1 < −1.4%
0.01 + 1.55𝑅𝑡−1 − 0.70𝑅𝑡−2 + 0.37𝑅𝑡−3 − 0.31𝑅𝑡−4 + 𝜇1𝑡   𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑡−1 ≥ −1.4%
 
Figure 9a and 9b plots the transition function 𝐺(∙) relative to the transition variable 
(𝑇𝑡−4) and transition variable (𝑅𝑡−1), respectively. Each point of the plots represents 
one observation. The steepness of the curves reflects the fast adjustment speed between 
regimes. The transition adjustment of both figures shows relatively rapid switches 
from one regime to the other. Figure 9a illustrates that the transactions are in regime 0 
(𝐺(∙) = 0) most of time, while Figure 9b displays that the price growth rates are in 
regime 1 (𝐺(∙) = 1) most of time. For the transaction model, there is a switch to 
regime 1 (𝐺(∙) = 1) only when the transaction in logarithm is beyond the threshold 
value of 8.58. For the price model, a regime switch is triggered only when the price 
growth rates start falling by more than 1.1% on annual basis. 
 
Figure 10a provides time series plots of the transactions and the corresponding 
transition functions, 𝐺(∙) for both the STAR and SETAR models. The figure reveals 
which upturns or downturns in the transactions (upper graph) are associated with 
regime switches (lower graphs). The housing transactions have been volatile in the 
past two decades. The housing transactions experience regime switches in response to 
the external shocks including the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998, Hong Kong’s 
Tenant Purchase Scheme in 1997-2002, the spread of SARS disease in 2003, several 
rounds of U.S. federal rate heightening in 2005, and the Global Financial Tsunami in 
2007-2008. The recent regime shifts are due to the introduction of several rounds of 
cooling measures. The transactions switch to the lower regime (regime 0) as the 
government introduced its first round stamp duty measure by imposing SSD in order 
to deter speculators in late 2010. However, the impact of SSD is quite short-lived as 
the transactions switch back to the upper regime (regime 1) after approximately one 
year time. Subsequently, a few more stamp duty measures are further introduced in 
October 2012. Since then, the transactions have been hovering at the lower regime till 
the end of our sample period, i.e. the mid of 2016. Notably, as the transition variable 
is the fourth lag of transaction, the switches between the regimes do not coincide 
exactly with the peaks and troughs of the transactions but usually take place a few 
months later.  
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Figure 10b provides time series plots of the price growth rates and the corresponding 
transition functions, 𝐺(∙)  for both the STAR and SETAR models. Given the 
similarity of the estimates of the two models, it is not surprising that both transition 
functions are fairly similar. Both functions display that housing price growth rates 
experience similar regime shifts with the transactions in response to the 
aforementioned external shocks. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the movements 
of transactions and prices start to diverge since late 2010, since when the transactions 
are considerably reduced while the price continues its upward trending, except for an 
episode of a dramatic price drop in late 2015 when the price switches to a lower regime. 
The price crash in late 2015 coincides with the moment when the speculation on the 
rise in US interest rates is mounting. Nevertheless, the regime switch is temporary as 
it shifts back to the higher regime (regime 1) in the second half of 2016. The results 
indicate that those measures can only suppress the housing transactions but are far less 
effective in reducing the housing price growth rates. Further, it should be noted that 
there remains a distinct difference in the transition functions of STAR and SETAR 
models. Specifically, the transition function of the STAR model can take on the values 
between 0 and 1, while the transition function of SETAR model can only take on the 
two extremeties, i.e. 0 and 1. As a consequence, lesser events or shocks may affect the 
variable only in the context of STAR model, but with no implication in SETAR model. 
In this case, the Euro crisis in 2011 and the introduction of DSD in early 2013, cause 
slight regime switches in STAR transition function, but are not reflected in the 
corresponding SETAR transition function. 
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Chapter 7. Policy Implications 
This thesis provides implications for the government interventions, which tightens the 
mortgage financing for households and imposes high transaction taxes on purchases 
or disposals of properties by speculators, non-local buyers and multi-home holders. 
Our empirical results find that the mortgage tightening measure generates distortions 
to housing market as it forces the households to purchase smaller-sized homes as a 
result of down-payment constraints. Therefore, the demand for larger-sized homes is 
apparently reduced while the demand for small-sized homes is increased. The findings 
also suggest that the stamp duty measure leads to lower trading activity in various 
market segments including submarket A, B and C, which in return causes lower supply 
of secondary homes, especially in the small-sized submarket. Consequently, the higher 
demand for starter homes as a result of mortgage tightening, in conjunction with lower 
supply of secondary homes due to the punitive tax leads to higher price growth rate in 
small-sized market segments, particularly in submarket A.  
 
The micro-evidence on market reaction to SSD draws a consistent conclusion with the 
existing literature in respect of the distortions caused to the distribution of housing 
prices and transactions. Specifically, the SSD creates significant lock-in effect as the 
existing homeowners are more inclined to hold the properties for longer period in order 
to avoid the punitive tax, rather than trade up frequently. On the other hand, for a 
proportion of households, especially those in possession of small-sized homes, who 
choose to dispose their properties within the restricted time period, they normally cut 
the selling price in order to reduce the tax obligations. Among this group, there exists 
a small fraction of households who are in urgent need to dispose their properties in 
short term due to the unexpected circumstances, such as financial difficulty, family 
issues, and etc. Therefore, the introduction of SSD makes those genuine home buyers, 
who are not the real speculators, suffer as they have to pay SSD tax in order to quickly 
dispose the property.  
 
On the contrary, Singapore achieves its intended goal through the introduction of 
several rounds of cooling measures, which are very similar to Hong Kong. Singapore 
started its intervention by tightening the mortgage financing and imposing additional 
transaction taxes in early 2010. Hong Kong and Singapore bear similarities in various 
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aspects including geological, economic and cultural aspects. Besides, both economies 
also share similarity in respect of the vibrant real estate markets. Both real estate 
markets have experienced robust housing demand from domestic and international 
buyers, while suffering the scarce availability of land. Therefore, it would be 
economically important to compare and contrast the policy effectiveness in the two 
economies. Figure 11 illustrates the historical movements of transactions and prices 
over the period of 2004-2016. The figure shows that the housing price in the private 
market started to fall since late 2013, in tandem with the substantial drop in the 
transaction volumes.  
 
The difference in the policy performance is essentially due to the fundamentally 
different residential market structure in the two economies. The vast majority of the 
first-time homebuyers rely on the HDB flats provided by the government at a highly 
discounted price in Singapore, while most of the first-time buyers is mainly reliant on 
the secondary starter homes released from the upgraders in Hong Kong. The details of 
the two residential real estate markets in both economies are depicted in the Appendix. 
Therefore, when the stamp duty measure suppresses the trading activity in Hong Kong, 
the supply of the second-hand homes, especially the small-sized homes in the private 
market will be substantially reduced as the existing homeowners choose to either hold 
their homes for longer time or just stay put. What’s worse, the mortgage tightening 
measure further increases the demand for starter homes due to the down-payment 
constraints. As a result, the severe demand-supply imbalance significantly pushes up 
the price in the small-sized segment. In contrast, the similar cooling measures targeting 
similar groups of buyers, such as short-term speculators, non-local buyers and local 
households in possession of multiple homes will not massively affect the first-time 
buyers through the channel of lower supply of secondary homes in Singapore. This is 
because those aspiring first-time buyers normally seek their first homes in the 
government-subsidized HDB flats. Therefore, both trading activity and housing prices 
will be negatively affected by the cooling measures in Singapore.   
 
Based on the empirical findings and comparison with Singapore, we propose the 
following recommendations for the government to consider:  
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1. The Hong Kong Government should lift the restrictions on the maximum loan that 
households can borrow from the banks for the first-time home buyers. Regardless of 
the property value, i.e. whether the property is a low-priced or higher-priced home, the 
government should allow the first-time buyers to borrow up to 90% of the property 
consideration. In such cases, the demand for small-sized homes somehow can be 
relaxed as a fraction of home buyers seek their homes in medium-sized or large-sized 
market segments.  
 
2. The Hong Kong Government should tweak the special stamp duty (SSD) in order 
to restore the trading activity in the secondary market, and thus increasing the supply 
of second-hand homes. Besides, by easing the SSD, those unintended victim who need 
to dispose their properties within a short period due to unexpected financial difficulty 
will be less severely hit. Practically, we suggest that for the properties bought and sold 
within one year, the SSD can remain at the original rate. But for those sold after one 
year but within three years, a capital gain tax can be applied to encourage trading up 
activities, and thus releasing more entry-level homes to aspiring first-time buyers.  
 
3. Similar housing policies can end up achieving very different consequences in the 
markets where the market structures are completely different. The residential market 
in Hong Kong is a market where the first-time home buyers are overwhelmingly reliant 
on the second-hand homes released from the existing upgraders. Therefore, any policy 
that might create significant lock-in effects in the market should be discreetly 
considered and evaluated before rolling out.  
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Chapter 8. Conclusions 
8.1. Major findings and contributions  
This thesis complements the existing literature by examining the effects of the cooling 
measures including mortgage tightening measures which increase the down-payments 
for households and stamp duty measures which impose heightened transaction tax on 
certain buyers in the residential re-sale market in Hong Kong, where the investigation 
of such measures remains understudied. Specifically, we investigate the impact of both 
measures on trading activity in the housing market in Hong Kong. Both measures are 
captured by two step function variables which increase by 1 each time the government 
tightens the measure. The paper also provides micro-evidence on market reactions to 
the special stamp duty in respect of the change in prices and transactions. In addition, 
the non-linear models are employed to model the dynamics of the market indicators, 
transactions and housing price, in the aggregate housing market, in order to detect the 
regime switching behaviors in response to the policy intervention. Essentially, we 
attempt to answer the two related questions: (i) Whether and to what extent the cooling 
measures will affect the trading activity in Hong Kong’s residential real estate market? 
(ii) Whether the special stamp duty will cause any distortions to the distribution of 
housing prices and transactions?  
 
Our empirical findings suggest that the cooling measures are a double-edged sword 
and the government should be very cautious when rolling out such measures. The 
empirical results are summarized below and the estimates are robust to various 
sensitivity checks.   
 
1. The mortgage tightening measure does not have any significant impact on the 
trading activity in the overall market, but generates heterogeneous effects to the 
various submarkets. Specifically, the demand for small-sized units, particularly units 
in submarket A, is significantly increased following the measure, while the demand 
for larger-sized properties, particularly in submarkets C and DE is significantly 
reduced. The opposite effects in submarkets caused by this measure imply that the 
mortgage tightening policy forces certain buyers who could have bought higher-end 
homes before the intervention to purchase a smaller-sized one. Further, the opposite 
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results help explain the insignificant impact of the measure on the overall trading 
activity in the overall market. 
 
2. The stamp duty measure plays a negative and statistically significant role in 
reducing the trading activity in the overall market, which implies that the market 
demand is more sensitive to the heightened transaction taxes. Unlike the mortgage 
tightening measure, this measure does not generate any opposite effects across various 
submarkets. The negative impact caused by this measure spreads across the 
submarkets from lower-end market segments to the higher-end segments, except for 
the luxury submarket DE. The negative shock on trading activity is the hardest in 
submarket A.  
 
3. The introduction of the special stamp duty leads to lower transaction prices of 
properties which are subject to the tax payment. The imposition of the special stamp 
duty tax rate is associated with a 6.8% decrease in transaction prices. The graphical 
evidence on the bunching in transactions slightly above the notch where the holding 
period is 24 or 36 months suggests that the special stamp duty creates significant lock-
in effects.  
 
4. Both the smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) model and self-exciting 
transition autoregressive (SETAR) model detect the regime switching behaviors in 
housing transactions following the government intervention, and the switch coincides 
with the time when the special stamp duty is introduced. On the contrary, the housing 
price does not experience any abrupt switches during the same period, except for the 
temporary episode in late 2015, indicating that those measures only have impacts on 
suppressing the trading activity, but fails to play an effective role in reducing the price 
appreciation.  
 
8.2. Limitations and future studies  
This thesis does have its limitations. (i) When examining the effects of both measures 
on trading activity, we are unable to employ a difference-in-differences method which 
would have allowed us to estimate the causal effect of a policy by comparing the 
average change over the time in the outcome variable for the treatment group with that 
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for the control group (David and Krueger, 1994). The major reason is that we can’t 
find an appropriate control group. On one hand, given Hong Kong’s peculiarity in 
respect of its political, economic and financial status, it is difficult to find a comparable 
metropolis which is free from the policy impact, for an unbiased estimation. On the 
other hand, the other real estate markets within Hong Kong, such as commercial 
market is not a suitable control group for the analysis either. The double ad valorem 
stamp duty, which is one of the stamp duty measures, not only affects residential 
markets, but also affects the other real estate markets. Further, some of the policies 
targeting the residential market may generate spillover effects as the investors seek 
alternative investments in other sectors, such as commercial sector. Therefore, those 
sectors are indirectly influenced by the policies which are so called targeting 
residential investors. (ii) This thesis only focuses on the market reactions to the special 
stamp duty while leaving the impacts of other transaction taxes untouched, due to the 
lack of transaction information on various aspects. Firstly, because of the information 
shortage on the nationality of buyers, we are unable to investigate the behavioral 
response of those non-local buyers to the buyer’s stamp duty (BSD) with a 15% flat 
rate. Similarly, the missing information on the status of buyers, i.e. whether the home 
buyer is a first-time buyer or an upgrader, refrains us from examining the possible 
reactions of those groups in response to the ad valorem double stamp duty (DSD).  
 
There are some related topics for future studies. Firstly, those tax penalties imposed 
on residential properties might create spillover effects as frenzied buyers start to seek 
other ‘safe heaven’ assets to place their idle liquidity. Consequently, the car parking 
lots including residential car parking space, which are not subject to the 
aforementioned taxes and requires relatively small amount of liquidity, become one of 
the major targets they can speculate. Besides, the policy may also divert part of the 
idle liquidity towards the commercial real estate market, such as office buildings. So 
the investigation on the market response in the car parking sector and the commercial 
market to the interventions mainly targeting residential sector could be the first attempt. 
Secondly, an investigation over the reaction of the first-hand residential market 
following the policy intervention could be another attempt as well. The developers 
adopt various sales strategies by either providing decent discounts or covering part of 
stamp duties for foreign buyers, in order to attract the desperate home buyers. 
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Particularly, the examination of the increasing supply of the tiny first-hand residential 
properties (aka nano flats) in recent years as a result of the shortage in the supply of 
secondary homes is of high importance.  
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APPENDICES 
Table 1: Mortgage tightening measures introduced by Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority since Oct 2009  
Date  Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio  Debt Servicing Ratio 
(DSR) 
Others  
Oct 2009 
(First Round) 
- For residential properties valued at 
$20 million or above, the LTV ratio 
was capped at 60% 
- For residential properties valued at 
below $20 million, the LTV ratio was 
maintained at 70%, the maximum 
loan amount was capped at $12 
million 
  
August 2010 
(Second Round) 
For residential properties valued at 
$12 million or above, the LTV ratio 
was capped at 60% 
- For residential properties valued at 
below $12 million, the LTV ratio was 
maintained at 70%, the maximum 
loan amount was capped at $7.2 
million 
The maximum DSR was 
standardised to 50% - The 
limit on DSR was capped at 
60% under stress test of an 
increase in mortgage rate of 
200 basis points 
 
November 2010 
(Third Round) 
- For residential properties valued at 
$12 million or above, the LTV ratio 
was capped at 50%  
- For residential properties valued at 
between $8 million and $12 million 
or below, the LTV ratio was capped 
at 60%, the maximum loan amount 
was capped at $6 million  
- For residential properties valued at 
below $8 million, the LTV ratio was 
capped at 70%, the maximum loan 
amount was capped at $4.8 million 
  
June 2011 
(Fourth Round) 
For residential properties valued at 
$10 million or above, the LTV ratio 
was capped at 50%  
- For residential properties valued at 
between $7 million and $10 million 
or below, the LTV ratio was capped 
at 60%, the maximum loan amount 
was capped at $5 million  
- For residential properties valued at 
below $7 million, the LTV ratio was 
maintained at 70%, the maximum 
loan amount was capped at $4.2 
million 
  
September 2012 
(Fifth Round) 
  The loan 
tenor of all 
new property 
mortgage 
loans was 
limited to 30 
years 
February 2013 
(Sixth Round) 
 Stress test of an increase of 
mortgage rate was set at 300 
basis points instead of 200 
basis points 
 
February 2015 
(Seventh Round) 
For residential properties valued at 
below $7 million, the LTV ratio was 
capped at 60% 
  
Source: Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
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Table 2: Stamp duty measures rolled out by Hong Kong Government since Nov 2010 
(a) Special stamp duty rates  
Date of 
Purchase/Acquisition 
Holding Period SSD Rate (on the actual 
price of market value, 
whichever is higher) 
Between 20 Nov 2010 and 
26 Oct 2012 (all inclusive)     
Up to 6 months  15% 
More than 6 months  
and up to 12 months  
10% 
More than 12 months  
and up to 24 months  
5% 
On and after 27 Oct 2010            Up to 6 months  20% 
More than 6 months  
and up to 12 months  
15% 
More than 12 months  
and up to 36 months  
10% 
 
(b) Buyer’s stamp duty  
With effect from 27 October 2012, unless specifically exempted, Buyer's Stamp 
Duty (BSD) is payable on an agreement for sale or a conveyance on sale executed 
for the acquisition of any residential property. BSD is charged at 15% on the stated 
consideration or the market value of the property (whichever is the higher). 
 
(c) Double stamp duty  
Rates of New AVSD (with effect from 23rd Feb 2013) 
Consideration or value of the property 
(whichever is the higher) in HK$ 
New AVSD Rate 
Up to 2,000,000 1.5% 
2,000,001 to 2,176,470 $30,000 + 20% of the excess over 
$2,000,000 
2,176,471 to 3,000,000 3.00% 
3,000,001 to 3,290,330 $90,000 + 20% of the excess over 
$3,000,000 
3,290,331 to 4,000,000 4.5% 
4,000,001 to 4,428,580 180,000 + 20% of the excess over 
$4,000,000 
4,428,581 to 6,000,000 6.00% 
6,000,001 to 6,720,000 $360,000 + 20% of the excess over 
$6,000,000 
6,720,001 to 20,000,000 7.5% 
20,000,001 to 21,739,130 $1,500,000+20% of the excess over 
$20,000,000 
21,739,131 and above 8.5% 
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Rates of original AVSD (with effect from 1st Apr 2010) 
Consideration or value of the property 
(whichever is the higher) in HK$ 
New AVSD Rate 
Up to 2,000,000 $100 
2,000,001 to 2,351,760 $100 + 10% of excess over $2,000,000 
2,351,761 to 3,000,000 1.5% 
3,000,001 to 3,290,320 $45,000 + 10% of excess over 
$3,000,000 
3,290,321 to 4,000,000 2.25% 
4,000,001 to 4,428,570 $90,000 + 10% of excess over 
$4,000,000 
4,428,571 to 6,000,000 3% 
6,000,001 to 6,720,000 $180,000 + 10% of excess over 
$6,000,000 
6,720,001 to 20,000,000 3.75% 
20,000,001 to 21,739,120 $750,000 + 10% of excess over 
$20,000,000 
21,739,121  and above 4.25% 
Source: Inland Revenue Department, Hong Kong  
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Price Index Calculations 
The factor of a property used for calculating price indices is derived by:  
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 
 
Where the rateable value of a property is an estimate of its annual rental at a 
reference date.  
 
By comparing the average factors of transacted properties over a period of time, we 
could measure the changes in value of the properties (not the qualitative differences 
like views and floor level among the properties) over the period.  
 
An example is quoted below for illustration:  
Transactions in Nov 2015  
Property A: 
Transaction price = $6,000,000  
Rateable value = $200,000  
Factor = 30.0  
Property B:  
Factor = 34.0  
 
Therefore, the average factor of Properties A & B is 32.0.  
 
Transactions in Dec 2015 
The average factor of four properties is 32.5.  
 
Therefore, the monthly price change between Nov 2015 and Dec 2015 is:  
(32.5 ÷ 32.0 - 1) x 100% = +1.6%.  
 
The basis of our indices is set at 1999 = 100.  If the price index in Dec 2015 is 300, 
it means the price level in Dec 2015 is 200% higher than the 1999 level.  
 
 
 
45 
Residential real estate market in Singapore  
Residential properties in Singapore are basically divided into three main types: (i) 
HDB flats, developed by the Housing Development Board of the government and only 
sold to the eligible citizens at subsidized prices; (ii) Non-landed private properties 
(condominiums homes), which can be purchased by residents including Singaporean 
citizens and permanent residents, as well as foreigners; (iii) Landed private properties, 
such as detached, semi-detached and terrace housings, which can only be owned by 
residents. These three home types form the housing ladder for the vast majority of 
families in Singapore. Households normally buy their first homes from the HDB 
market and then upgrade to a better and private home once they accumulate sufficient 
income and equity. According to the Department of Statistics of Singapore, HDB flats 
account for approximately 80% of the total residential properties and are home for 
over 80% of population in Singapore, while private condominium properties only take 
a proportion of 14.4% in 2016.  
 
Residential real estate market in Hong Kong  
Residential properties in Hong Kong can be classified into two categories. (i) Public 
housing estates, developed by Hong Kong Housing Authority and Hong Kong 
Housing Society and can be rent or sold to eligible Hong Kong citizens; (ii) Private 
properties with various home sizes, which can be owned by residents and foreigners. 
Public housing estates including public rental housing and subsidized-sale public 
housing estates accommodate about 46% of the population in Hong Kong in 2015 
based on the statistics compiled by Housing Authority of Hong Kong. Notably, public 
rental housing estates are the most numerous type of the public housing estates and 
accommodate around 30% of the total population. Essentially, it is only rented at 
highly discounted rates to low-income residents. Therefore, unlike residents in 
Singapore, majority of the population in Hong Kong seek their homes in the private 
market. The private residential market can be divided into five segments based on the 
home size, i.e. Class A, B, C, D and E. Class A and B are normally considered as 
starter homes for the first time home buyers. Residents then can trade up to higher-end 
homes like Class C, D or E when their accumulated income and equity permit the 
upgrading.  
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Table 1: Sample statistics of the secondary residential housing market  
Panel A: Transaction-level statistics  
 Mean  Std. Dev.  
Price (`000 HKD) 3,156 237 
Salable area (sqft) 532 176 
Floor level  19 13 
Age  14 9 
Observations  479,258  
Panel B: Time series statistics    
 Mean  Std. Dev. 
Monthly transactions  
Annual price return  
4007 
0.046 
2145 
0.184 
Observations  234  
Notes: The sample period is from 1997M1 to 2016M6. (a). In Panel A, price is in nominal term. Unit size refers to the salable area of each 
unit. Age is calculated as the time difference between transaction date and the building completion date. Monthly transaction. (b). In Panel 
B, monthly transaction is achieved by aggregating transactions across estates in each month. Annual price return refers to the growth rate 
in a particular month with respect to the same month in previous year.  
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Table 2: The impact on estate-specific (speculative) trading activity (%) in overall market  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Overall Turnover   Speculative Turnover   Overall Turnover  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) 
MT 0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
 -0.016 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
 0.004 
(0.008) 
SD 
 
 
-0.184*** 
(0.014) 
-0.165*** 
(0.013) 
 -0.039* 
(0.002) 
-0.071*** 
(0.018) 
 -0.125*** 
(0.018) 
SD* Pre-policy speculation 
 
      -0.224*** 
(0.024) 
Control variables  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Estate fixed effect  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Month fixed effect  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
𝑅2 0.27 0.41  0.19 0.26  0.29 
Observations  25,557 16,151  13,751 8,335  24,191 
Notes: This table studies the impact of the mortgage tightening measure (MT) and the stamp duty measure (SD) on (speculative) trading activity in the overall market. The dependent variable in each specification is turnover. The 
overall turnover in Columns (1), (2) and (5) is the the monthly total transactions scaled by estate size (total stock of each estate). The speculative turnover in Columns (3)-(4) is the monthly transactions of properties with holding 
period being no more than 24 months scaled by estate size. We regress the estate turnover of interest on two policy variables, along with other control variables. The control variables include exports, unemployment rate, Hang 
Seng index, best lending rate, and three dummies including the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998, the Hong Kong Tenant Purchase Scheme from 1997 till the end of 2002, and the Global Financial Crisis in 2007-2008. Estate 
fixed effects are included. Seasonal variations are also controlled. Standard errors are clustered at the estate level and reported in the parentheses. ***, *** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 3: The impact on estate-specific trading activity (%) in submarkets  
 
 
 
  
 Turnover  
Submarket A 
 Turnover  
Submarket B 
 Turnover  
Submarket C 
 Turnover  
Submarket DE 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
MT 0.033*** 
(0.007) 
0.018*** 
(0.005) 
 -0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.008* 
(0.005) 
 -0.013*** 
(0.004) 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
 -0.023*** 
(0.008) 
-0.022** 
(0.009) 
SD 
 
 
-0.171*** 
(0.019) 
-0.150*** 
(0.016) 
 -0.110*** 
(0.011) 
-0.103*** 
(0.018) 
 -0.015* 
(0.008) 
-0.017** 
(0.007) 
 0.022 
(0.018) 
0.018 
(0.020) 
Control variables  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Estate fixed effect  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Month fixed effect  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
𝑅2 0.39 0.51  0.33 0.43  0.32 0.43  0.41 0.47 
Observations  12,709 7,709  21,039 13,512  6,453 4,152  1,445 862 
Notes: This table studies the impact of the mortgage tightening measure (MT) and the stamp duty measure (SD) on trading activity in the submarkets (A, B, C and DE). The dependent variable in each specification is turnover. The turnover in each 
submarket is the monthly transactions of properties under each specification scaled by estate size. We regress the estate turnover of interest on two policy variables, along with other control variables. The control variables include exports, 
unemployment rate, Hang Seng index, best lending rate, and three dummies including the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998, the Hong Kong Tenant Purchase Scheme from 1997 till the end of 2002, and the Global Financial Crisis in 2007-2008. 
Estate fixed effects are included. Seasonal variations are also controlled. Standard errors are clustered at the estate level and reported in the parentheses. ***, *** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
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Table 4: The impact of special stamp duty on housing prices  
 Main result Holding period 
within 48 months 
Before SSD 
 (1) (2) (3) 
𝑺𝑺𝑫 -0.068** 
(0.031) 
-0.065** 
(0.029) 
 
𝑯𝟎−𝟐𝟒   0.013 
(0.031) 
𝑅2 0.002 0.002 0.001 
Observations 14,105 12,330 36,434 
Notes: Column (1) reports the estimate for the transaction prices of properties since the introduction of the special stamp duty (SSD). Column (2) presents the 
estimate of the sub-sample where we restrict the sample to properties with holding period no more than 48 months. Column (3) shows the coefficient estimate 
of 𝐻0−24 for the period before the introduction of SSD, i.e. 01 Jan 2009- 19 Nov 2011. Our regressor of interest, 𝐻0−24, is an indicator which equals 1 if the 
properties are disposed within 24 months since the last acquisition and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the estate level and reported in the 
parentheses. ***, *** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Estimates of the STAR and SETAR Models for Transactions  
 STAR  SETAR  
 Transactions  Transactions  
Linear Part    
Constant 1.2144*** 
(0.4650) 
1.2758*** 
(0.4600) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1 0.8847*** 
(0.0764) 
0.8835*** 
(0.1046) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−2 -0.0290 
(0.1018) 
-0.0269 
(0.1046) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−3 -0.2041** 
(0.0984) 
-0.2045** 
(0.0998) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−4 0.1753* 
(0.0984) 
0.1661* 
(0.0985) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−5 0.0388 
(0.1045) 
0.0458 
(0.1067) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−6 0.0743 
(0.1011) 
0.0707 
(0.1039) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−7 -0.0907 
(0.0754) 
 
-0.0932 
(0.0775) 
Nonlinear Part    
Constant 3.9975** 
(1.7068) 
5.2533*** 
(1.6725) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1 -0.1462 
(0.1379) 
0.7273*** 
(0.1149) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−2 -0.0391 
(0.1766) 
-0.0804 
(0.1478) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−3 0.6862*** 
(0.1779) 
0.5018*** 
(0.1517) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−4 -0.3981** 
(0.1844) 
-0.2273 
(0.1526) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−5 -0.3096 
(0.2039) 
-0.2743 
(0.1705) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−6 -0.0987 
(0.1676) 
-0.0287 
(0.1366) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−7 -0.1413 
(0.1359) 
-0.0221* 
(0.1150) 
𝜸 100.0001 
(101.0349) 
 
C 8.582*** 
(0.0157) 
8.585 
Akaike Information Criterion -670 -674 
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the STAR and SETAR models for monthly transaction adjustments. The joint estimation of 
the threshold parameter 𝑐, and the other model parameters in STAR model is achieved by employing the nonlinear least squares 
method. The parameter 𝑐, in SETAR model is found by a grid search. The transition variable is the fourth lag of transactions. Standard 
errors for the coefficients are reported in the parentheses, and ***, *** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively.   
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Table 6: Estimates of the STAR and SETAR Models for Price Growth Rate  
 STAR  SETAR  
 Price Growth Rate Price Growth Rate 
Linear Part    
Constant -0.0083 
(0.0067) 
-0.0086* 
(0.0052) 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1 1.5153*** 
(0.0916) 
1.5152*** 
(0.0927) 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−2 -0.7439*** 
(0.1605) 
-0.7322*** 
(0.1621) 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−3 0.3280** 
(0.1576) 
0.3024* 
(0.1557) 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−4 -0.1778** 
(0.0084) 
 
-0.1652** 
(0.0806) 
Nonlinear Part    
Constant 0.0208 
(0.0084) 
0.0117** 
(0.0045) 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1 0.0420 
(0.1331) 
1.5509*** 
(0.0907) 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−2 0.0423 
(0.2454) 
-0.7021*** 
(0.1775) 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−3 0.0203 
(0.2495) 
0.3676** 
(0.1826) 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−4 -0.1262 
(0.1324) 
-0.3130*** 
(0.1019) 
𝜸 61.9231 
(50.1486) 
 
C -0.0110 
(0.0317) 
-0.0137 
Akaike Information Criterion -1645 -1653 
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the STAR and SETAR models for price growth rate. The joint estimation of the threshold 
parameter 𝑐, and the other model parameters in STAR model is achieved by employing the nonlinear least squares method. The 
parameter 𝑐, in SETAR model is fund by a grid search. The transition variable is the first lag of price growth rate. Standard errors for 
the coefficients are reported in the parentheses, and ***, *** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.   
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Figure 1: Aggregate housing price index (1999=100), transaction volumes and the timeline of cooling measures (1997M1-2016M6) 
 
Notes:  
The housing price index (LHS) and transaction volumes (RHS) are at monthly frequency  
The housing price index is quality adjusted and refers to the housing price in the private secondary residential housing market  
The monthly transaction refers to the transactions occurred in the secondary market and is aggregated by the author  
The vertical lines represent the time when each round of cooling measures is introduced  
MT1 and MT2 refer to the first and second round of mortgage tightening measures in Oct 2009 and Aug 2010 respectively.  
MT3 to MT7 refers to the subsequent rounds of mortgage tightening measures. 
SSD1 and SSD2 refer to the special stamp duty and its enhancement in Nov 2010 and Oct 2012 respectively.  
Source: Rating and Valuation Department; Midland Realty database  
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Figure 2: Speculative trading activity by holding period in the secondary residential market (2009M1- 2016M6) 
 
Notes:  
Short-term speculative trading activity by different holding periods is aggregated at the monthly frequency  
The vertical lines refer to several rounds of stamp duty measures 
Source: Midland Realty database, self-estimated by author  
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Figure 3: Market loan-to-value ratio (%) (1997M1- 2016M6) 
 
Note: The vertical line refers to the start of mortgage tightening measures in October 2009.  
Source: Hong Kong Monetary Authority  
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Figure 4: Special stamp duty tax rates based on holding periods of properties 
 
Notes: The figure plots the special stamp duty (SSD) tax rates as a function of holding period of properties which were obtained 
since 20th Nov 2010. The solid line illustrates the SSD tax rate (SSD1) for properties obtained between 20th Nov 2010 and 26th 
Oct 2012 (all inclusive). The dash line displays the enhanced SSD tax rate (SSD2) for properties obtained since 27th Oct 2012.   
Source: Inland Revenue Department, Hong Kong  
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Figure 5: Private domestic units sub-divided by reference to floor area  
Class A: Saleable area less than 40𝑚2 
Class B: Saleable area of 40𝑚2 to 69.9𝑚2 
Class C: Saleable area of 70𝑚2 to 99.9𝑚2 
Class D: Saleable area of 100𝑚2 to 159.9𝑚2 
Class E: Saleable area of 160𝑚2 or above 
Source: Rating and Valuation Department, Hong Kong  
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Figure 6: Historical movement of housing price index of Class A versus Class DE (1997M1-2016M6) 
 
Notes:  
The solid line represents the housing price index of Class A. 
The dash line represents the housing price index of Class DE. 
The vertical line refers to the start of mortgage tightening measures in October 2009.  
Source: Rating and Valuation Department, Hong Kong  
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Figure 7: Transaction density based on holding period  
(a) Property transactions before SSD versus after SSD1 
 
(b) Property transactions after SSD1 versus after SSD2 
 
Notes: The two graphs plot the density of properties which were obtained between 1st Jan 2009 and 30th Jun 2016. The bin width 
is 1 month and the holding period is up to 50 months. Graph (a) plots the density of properties which were obtained between 1st 
Jan 2009 and 19th Nov 2010 versus the density of properties that were obtained between 20th Nov 2010 and 26th Oct 2012 as a 
function of holding period. Graph (b) plots the density of properties which were obtained between 20 th Nov 2010 and 26th Oct 
2012 versus the density of properties which were obtained between 27 th Nov 2012 and 30th Jun 2016 as a function of holding 
period. The vertical lines (solid) in Graphs (a) and (b) refer to the restricted holding period (24 months) under which properties 
are subject to SSD1. The vertical line (dash) in Graph (b) refers to the restricted holding period (36 months) under which properties 
are subject to SSD2 
Source: Midland Realty database, self-estiamted by author  
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Figure 8: Logistic and exponential transition functions (G) against transition 
vatriable (s), with varying values of gamma (𝛾) 
  
Notes: The figure plot the transaction functions (G) against the transaction variables for the two-regime case (left graph) and 
three-regime case (right graph). The threshold value 𝑐, is set to 0 in both cases. The values of 𝛾 are set equal to 2, 5 and 15 for both 
plots. Both plots show that a larger value of 𝛾 makes the plot steeper. 
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Figure 9: Plots of transition functions (G) against transition variables 
       (a)       (b) 
  
 
Notes: This figure plots the graphs of the transaction function (G) relative to the transition variable. The left graph plots the 
transaction function against the transition variable, the fourth lag of the transaction, T(t-4). The right graph plots the transaction 
function against the transition variable, the first lag of the price growth rate, R(t-1). Each fitted point of the plots represent one 
observation. The adjustment speed between the regimes is reflected in the steepness of the curves. The both indicators (transaction 
and price) show relatively rapid switches from one regime to the other.  
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Figure 10: Transaction, price and transition functions (G) for STAR and SETAR 
models 
(a) (b) 
Monthly Transactions (in Logarithm) Price Growth Rate 
  
 
G for STAR 
 
G for STAR 
  
 
G for SETAR 
 
G for SETAR 
  
 
Notes: This figure plots the time series of monthly transactions (left upper graph) and price growth rate (right upper graph) 
and the corresponding transition functions, (G) (lower graphs), over the estimation peirod from 1997-2016 for both the STAR 
and the SETAR models. The transition function, (G) of the STAR model can take the values between 0 and 1, while the 
transition function, (G) of the SETAR model can only take on the values of 0 and 1. The figure highlights which upturns and 
downturns in the transition and price are associated with regimes swtiches over the selected sample period.  
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Figure 11: Housing price index (2009Q1=100) and transaction volumes in private residential market in Singapore (2004Q1-2016Q4) 
 
Notes:  
The vertical line (solid) refers to the start of cooling measures in Feb 2010. 
The vertical line (dash) refers to the time point when the housing price started to fall.  
Source: Urban Redevelopment Authority, Singapore  
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